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1 If it is true, as Raymond Boisvert wrote almost a decade ago in the Transactions of the
Charles S. Peirce Society, that there are two schools of Dewey scholarship – the ‘method-
centered’ set and the ‘lived experience’ group – then the publication of this manuscript,
once thought lost, should be a force for reunification of the two.1 Indeed, providing a
common  vocabulary  between  science  and  generic  values  such  as  freedom  and
consummatory experience, a vocabulary generated through a critical theory of society
and culture, is precisely what Dewey claims to be about in this book. In the first chapter
assembled from a number of manuscripts in the Dewey Collection in Southern Illinois
University’s Special Collection, he writes: 
Time generally reveals indeed a considerable amount of illusion in the supposition
that prior science has been dealing with material pure from social adulteration. But
the presence of this illusory does not affect the ideal of science; as it progresses, it
develops a technique and a symbolism for the purpose of discounting the socially
contributed factor, of reducing it to a minimum. Philosophy, on the other hand, is
pre-eminently occupied with precisely this intervening factor. It is at home when
engaged  in  criticizing,  evaluating,  clearing  up,  and  systematizing  socially
conditioned beliefs. (15)
What  Dewey  would  want  to  cement  in  the  minds  of  readers  of  this  “lost”
manuscript is that “the sickliest way in which a student of philosophy can approach
his subject-matter is that of a search for ultimate impersonal revelation of truth.”
(16)
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2 Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy (UPMP),  stitched together from fragments
written by Dewey between 1941 and 1943 by editor Phillip Deen, is a sprawling text
with a not-too-unfamiliar thesis: “we have never been modern.” However, coining the
right term for what western philosophical life has become over its 2500 year history is
an opportunity for that rarest of occurrences, the Deweyan neologism. The adjective
‘unmodern’ jars, but as the reader will discover, it is an apposite term for what Dewey
sees as an unfortunate double movement in intellectual history: first, a fragmented and
unprogressive dialectic  of  epistemology and metaphysics  constrained by ideas from
Greek and medieval thought; second, the production of the illusion of revolutionary
change around the time of Descartes, flowering in the Enlightenment and consolidated
and sharpened by scientific and analytic philosophies in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. ‘Unmodern’ as the name for this double movement in history thus
serves  as  a  stark  contrast  to  Dewey’s  own  programmatic  statement  of  ‘cultural
naturalism’ – a truly modern philosophy – offered in the second part of the book. Taken
together, Deen calls the pieces of UPMP a “cultural history of modern philosophy” (xli).
His general introduction and editor’s notes are informative, and he provides a short but
well-chosen  bibliography  of  texts  that  allow  interested  readers  to  culturally  and
philosophically contextualize Dewey’s late work output.
3 The structure of the book, assembled as it has been out of “a manuscript of 160,000
words broken into hundreds of fragments” (xli), is more difficult to use than Dewey’s
other  extant  works  criticizing  “with  malice  prepense”  the  history  of  philosophy,
including  Reconstruction  in  Philosophy,  The  Quest  for  Certainty,  and  the  early,  highly
significant essay “The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge.” According to Deen,
the completeness of portions of the text was highly variable – for example, the chapters
“The Search for  Salvation,”  regarding medieval  philosophy and theology,  and “The
Supreme Human Art,”  dealing with advances  from Hume to  Hegel,  were extremely
fractured. Other chapters were extensively rewritten, but a few, particularly those in
the  latter  part  of  the  book,  in  which Dewey weighs  in  on  supposedly  perennial
questions of philosophy, were largely extant. In general, the farther one reads into the
book,  the  repetitions  become  fewer  and  textual  gaps  become  narrower,  plus  the
narrative becomes more cohesive while the arguments are more incisive. It is entirely
possible to read the last six of the book’s fourteen chapters on their own in order to
access a distillation of Dewey’s thinking during a time, of his own admission, when
“philosophy didn’t seem to have much place in this hell of a world” (xli).
4 The themes of UPMP resound with other of Dewey’s well-known if shorter contributions
from  this  period,  like  “Nature  in  Experience  (1940),  “Anti-Naturalism  in  Extremis”
(1943), and his extensive introduction to the collection The Problems of Men (1946). This
latter source provides a favorite quotation of Dewey’s from Matthew Arnold that serves
as  both  the  title  for  a  pivotal  chapter  in  UPMP and the  theme of  the  entire  book:
“Wandering between two worlds,  one dead/The other powerless to be born.” UPMP 
serves not only as Dewey’s effort to diagnose the reasons for this kind of wandering,
but also as an opportunity to clarify his opposition to a certain self-defeating view of
philosophy’s  role  in  general  in  fueling  intelligent  social  progress.  Also  in  the
introduction to Problems of Men, Dewey introduces the challenge by taking aim at the
Humean dimensions of Bertrand Russell’s social theory, claiming:
A  distinguished  member  of  this  school  of  contemporary  thought  has  recently
written  that  “the  actions  of  men,  in  innumerable  important  respects,  have
depended their theories asto the world and human life, as to what is good and evil.”
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But he has also written that what men hold about “what is good and evil” is wholly
a matter of sheer likes and dislikes. They, in turn, are so completely private and
personal – in the terminology of philosophy so “subjective” – as to be incapable of
judgment  having  “objective”  grounds.  Likes  and  dislikes  are  immune  to
modification by knowledge since they dwell in inaccessible privacy.2
5 Questioning  Hume’s  emotivism,  but  endorsing  his  anti-intellectualist  slogan,  “Be  a
philosopher, but amid all your philosophy be still a man,” Dewey launches a program of
“cultural naturalism” in UPMP.
6 ‘Culture’ became an extremely important term for Dewey in the last few of his major
publications. Just as a number of other Dewey scholars has done, Deen muses on why
Dewey  would  have  chosen  to  replace  the  titular  ‘experience’  with  ‘culture’  in  the
unfinished reintroduction to Experience and Nature. “It is clear that it is a term inclusive
of the whole range of human association,” Deen writes. “By turning to ‘culture,’ Dewey
once again  hoped to  escape the  inherited dualisms and divisions  that  had brought
down experience, practice, and a host of other terms” (xli). It also seems clear that, by the
point  Dewey  began  the  project  of  UPMP,  he  realized  that  ‘experience’  was  an
appropriate  term  to  unite  the  organic  metaphors  that  Experience  and  Nature was
structured around. Indeed, he says just this in introducing the final chapter of UPMP,
“Experience  as  Life-Function.”  Even  here,  however,  the  distinction  between
‘experience’ and ‘culture’ cannot be clearly made, since the former, as a synonym for
‘living’ and ‘life-functions,’  “stand for events whose nature is most clearly and fully
presented in human living, a fact which is equivalent in general to recognition of the
soci-cultural nature of the phenomena dealt with” (315). Building on this, the ‘culture’
of  ‘cultural  naturalism’  represents  a  plethora  of  distinctive  types of  experience  –
explored, for example, in the arguments of A Common Faith and Art as Experience. In the
indexing of UPMP,  Deen calls  our attention to Dewey’s own formulation of ‘cultural
naturalism’ as a way of broaching the artificial distinction between the categories of
‘material’ and ‘ideal.’ After contrasting the approach of historical materialism to social
phenomena with neo-Hegelian views equating Reason with the state, Dewey claims:
The issue as between these two schools of thought is not even debatable, provided
the  social  phenomena  in  question  are  defined  in  cultural  terms.  For  when  the
identity of social in its human sense and bearing with the cultural is admitted, it has
also  to  be  admitted  that  material  aspects  of  culture  […]  exist  and  act  only  in
connection with that which is non-material; only in connection with knowledge,
valuations and communication of meanings, while it is equally true that the latter
exist in a social sense only through the instrumentality of a more or less complex
equipment of material agencies. And, to repeat, the material and the non-material
are so fused or interpenetrated in culture that the subject matters in question
represent only distinctions in inquiry and discourse, not separations in existence.
(294)
7 UPMP demonstrates that ‘culture’ can be substituted for ‘experience’ in the same way
that  Dewey  once  claimed  that  experience  is  both  process  and  product.  Thus  the
Deweyan critical  cultural  theory  in  this  book utilizes  cultural  resources  to  critique
other strains of culture, without every displaying the need to resort to a transcendental
level of criticism. In point of fact, Dewey is extraordinarily vocal about why there is no
need to move to such a level in this manuscript, an unnecessary strategy that he terms
in one place a “maze of reduplications” (165). 
8 As previously mentioned, UPMP is sweeping in its scope, and this is perhaps the reason
why Dewey thought that the project had gotten away from him in correspondence with
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Ratner. Its first chapter, “Philosophy and the Conflict of Beliefs,” sees Dewey delving
far back into human prehistory in an effort to ground his analysis on pre-philosophic
beliefs. His starting point is “the distinction drawn […] between the ordinary and the
extraordinary,” which will eventually be treated as the natural and the supernatural.
Advocates of naturalism may have a more difficult time gauging the birth of genuinely
philosophical  thought  (as  opposed to  rationalists,  who can point  to  methodological
considerations in Thales or other Presocratics) without simply referring to the shift
from  religious,  supernatural  thinking,  but  Dewey  doesn’t  lean  on  that  post  here.
Instead,  he  claims  that  the  difference  between the  ordinary  and the  extraordinary
(which  may  itself  be  divided  into  the  ‘lucky’  and  the  ‘sacred’)  is  one  based  on
“immediate emotional and imaginative experience” (6). Heightened emotional states –
and in particular, those based in fear and the need for security – led beliefs about the
extraordinary to a higher estate in the hearts and minds of early peoples. This analysis
works well with Dewey’s understanding of the social forces underlying classical Greek
philosophy as utilizing hierarchical metaphysical principles to guard cherished values,
a view presented in UPMP and “The Signficance of the Problem of Knowledge,” among
other works.  In this  early chapter, Dewey also displays a  degree of  foresight about
cultural universals reflected more currently in the work of Kwasi Wiredu. Wiredu has
famously shown that the animistic Akan tradition does not couch their notion of the
supernatural  in  terms  of  a  material/spiritual  distinction.  Similarly  challenging  the
notion  that  “primitive  man,  in  that  early  stage  wherein  some  religious  belief
demonstrably  exists,  had  attained  a  definite  notion  of  any  coherent  psychological
unity,” Dewey calls such a view about “the centre of thought” as being “the outcome of
a highly sophisticated subjective doctrine” of much later times (10).
9 The Greek philosophical heritage is assayed in two chapters, “The Story of Nature” and
“The Discovery of Rational Discourse.” In dealing with Greek naturalism, Dewey points
to the importance of the early Greek sensitivity to change and often reminds us that
physis was understood in terms of principles, or archê, not substances. Establishing at
least partial connections with his own naturalism, Dewey notes, “Nature is the native,
the inherent and abiding, and also the normal, the pattern of regularity, the base-line
from which to measure deviations” (25). Up until Aristotle, the absence of a concept of
substance, with all its inherent problems, provides both “a relief and a perplexity” to
modern thought, according to him (23). By contrast, one intriguing thesis that Dewey
develops here is the connection between the Greek agrarian tradition, the notion of
growth and later philosophical systems that that rely on a picture of “orderly change”
through “the resolution of the opposed tendencies of growth between opposites and by
union of opposites, and of stable, unchanging kinds” (28). More familiar to students of
Dewey’s work on the prehistory of science will be the countervailing tendency toward
promoting values discovered through techne and craftsmanship – the idea that “since
the reshaping of things comes from without,” for example, “it is absurd to ascribe to
natural elements a tendency toward some particular outcome…” (30). When we move
to  the  Athenian  Greeks  in  the  following  chapter,  Dewey’s examination  is  more  de
rigueur, save for the interesting spin put on the character of Socrates implied by the
title. In “discovering rational discourse,” Socrates was not merely paving the way for
the abstraction and specialization that all philosophizing requires, but also asking the
question, “What is the nature of thinking when it reaches or purports to reach its goal:
the truth about things?” (40). The attempt to answer this question from Platonic and
Aristotelian perspectives occupies Dewey for the rest of this chapter.
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10 The chapter inquiring into the conditions of philosophizing during the Middle Ages is
where Dewey begins to reveal the persistent hold that certain ancient ideas continue to
have on modern philosophy.  One of  these is  the legacy of  scholasticism,  which for
Dewey  is  less  about  a  particular  body  of  knowledge  or  even  deductive  ‘scientific’
method, but rather about spectatorship and disciplinary power. Participation in remaking
the social order was not to be spontaneous, but “dictated from the side of Being,” on
this  scheme,  and  those  in  charge  of  the  most  important  social  affairs,  medieval
theologians whom Dewey compares to Platonic philosopher-kings, work in the service
of rigid social stratification. Dewey also begins to develop a critical focus on the history
of  the  concept  of  ‘law’  beginning  with  the  Romans,  continuing  on  through  the
conception  of  physical  laws  and  the  Kantian  moral  law.  In  his  view,  the  primary
contribution of Roman culture to western philosophy was providing an opportunity for
will  to  usurp the  place  of  reason:  not  only the  Stoics  tell  us  that  “Moral  laws  are
inherently rational. They come to us as commands in that Supreme Being, Reason and
Will are one” (60).
11 When we come to the early modern period and the scientific revolution that is so key in
Dewey’s revaluation of episteme, phronesis, and techne, we must ask, “what is genuinely
modern in the philosophies that have appeared since the sixteenth century?” (74). As
mentioned earlier, the four middle chapters form the ‘spine’ of this book’s arguments;
together, they represent an interpretation of philosophy from Bacon through Hegel,
with a particular emphasis on the rationalism of Descartes and the empiricism of Locke.
This period, framed by the ‘moral crisis’ of Copernicanism, is one of false starts and
intellectual  cul-de-sacs,  Dewey  explains.  He  points  out  the  period’s  hidden  “new
emphasis,” appearing in germ in this period, on the meaning and implications of “the
discovery of human nature as a potential means of directing the human career
emancipated from submergence in the cosmic scheme” (74). To oversimplify, Dewey
sees this new emphasis as resting on three realizations: first, an aversion to fatalism in
the discovery of new human powers; second, the way to operationalize this discovery
through a “new method of knowing,” freed from pre-scientific pretenses by thinkers
like Descartes and Hume; and third, the end toward which this all tends, “what Bacon
called the advancement of the human estate” (75).
12 Much  of  what  Dewey  ponders  regarding  Descartes  and  Locke  in  these  chapters  –
particularly  the  chapter  “From  Cosmic  Nature  to  Human  Nature”  –  should  be  of
interest  not  only  to  scholars  of  pragmatism  and  Dewey’s  genealogical  method  of
criticizing the tradition, but also to those interested in comparative investigations of
rationalism and empiricism.  In  particular,  Dewey links  the  problem of  solipsism in
Descartes’s Meditations not only to his proof for the existence of God, but to the fatal
flaw of assigning certainty to mathematical knowledge fundamentally. Through a close
examination  of  Locke’s  theory  of  ideas,  Dewey  lays  the  groundwork  for  a  closer
association of this British physicist with Gottfried Leibniz than is normally assumed to
exist. Dewey’s assertion that “‘sensations’ in the case of Locke are not mental; they are
rather physiological; they become ideas when the power of perception is directed upon
then” opens up the possibility that for Locke, as well as for Leibniz, there is more in
sensation that what is perceived at any given time (89, n. 32). Dewey also spends time
examining Locke’s hypostatization of reason, an investigation that leads him to assert
that,  at  least  “in  the popular  sense  of  the  word  rationalist,”  Locke  was  more  of  a
rationalist than Descartes.
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13 Three strategies undergird the transition from the ‘unmodern’  residue of  European
philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to Dewey’s reconstruction of
philosophical problems of “Mind and Body” and “The Practical and the Theoretical”
(among others) in the last six chapters. The first will be familiar to those well versed in
Dewey’s  “The  Need  for  a  Recovery  in  Philosophy”  (1917):  the  critique  of  generic
epistemological problems about knowledge in favor of local epistemologies of practice.
The second takes this framework of criticism and reconstruction and applies it to the
examination  of  idiomatic  uses  of  philosophical  terms  like  ‘mind’  (a  strategy  also
employed by Paul Ricœur in looking at etymological usage and which might interest
those attempting to define a Deweyan hermeneutic as Charlene Haddock Seigfried did
for William James).3 Dewey believes that when idiomatic usage strays far from even the
simplest philosophical usage, the former can provide pragmatic clues to the meanings
attached to behaviors that use the term, and that this provides a significant type of
behavioral (but not behaviorist!) analysis. For example:
The word minding in these cases is equivalent to an attentive act, an act of caring for
which involves doing something with or to surrounding circumstances, and hence,
truistically, involves organic action, that is, the body. As long as we take our clew
from and find our relevant data in observable facts, we are bound to employ the
kind of behavior exemplified in the above words as the subject matter on the ground
of which to form a theory of mind and [the] mental. (207)
14 Another trenchant analysis of the term “person” in the chapter “Things and Persons”
presents innovative views that complement the important essays “The Unity of the
Human Being” (1939) and “Time and Individuality” (1940). In this chapter and “Mind
and Body” there are a number of passages that relate Dewey’s cultural naturalism to
commitments and normative statuses, and should be of interest to those who look at
pragmatism through the lens of Robert Brandom’s analytic philosophy. The project of
these  later  chapters  can  also  be  read  to  engage  with  Richard  Rorty’s  deflationary
concept of the role of philosophy as an ongoing conversation. Although Dewey would
agree that this conversation on values and vocabularies should, by its very nature, not
have a terminus, it’s clear from the mode of presentation of the chapters in Part Two
that  Dewey  believes  considerable  work  needs  to  be  done  by  public  intellectuals
deploying cultural naturalism to criticize and revise beliefs,  attitudes,  practices and
institutions.
15 Deen’s edition of Dewey’s book should be a welcome addition to the bookshelves of
Dewey scholars.  They will  find much in the chapters in Part One of the book to be
repetitive, as we have a manuscript that Dewey was not able to refine nor subject to the
editorial  concerns  of  his  own  time  and  place.  However,  as  noted  above  there  are
significant  new  passages  in  Part  One;  Part  Two,  on  crafting  a  genuinely  modern,
distinctively  American  philosophy,  is  well  worth  one’s  careful  and  close  attention.
Unmodern  Philosophy  and  Modern  Philosophy not  only  asserts  the  impact  of  scientific
method and technology on Dewey’s burgeoning cultural naturalism, providing a bridge
allowing Boisvert’s  ‘method-centered’  and ‘lived experienced’  Deweyans to converse
more  freely,  it  also  demonstrates  both  a  harder  edge  to  Dewey’s  criticism  of  the
tradition  as  well  as  his  incipient  romanticism.  Dewey  not  only  frames  the  central
chapter of the manuscript around Victorian poet and social critic Matthew Arnold’s
“Wandering  between  two  worlds”  stanza,  but  he  initiates  that  chapter  with  an
extensive quotation from Arnold that, in many ways, conveys Dewey’s entire project.
“Modern times find themselves with an immense body of institutions, established facts,
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accredited dogmas, customs and rules, which have come to us from times not modern.
In this system their life has to be carried forward; yet they have a sense that their
system is not of their own creation, and that it by no means corresponds exactly with
the wants of their actual life; that, for them, it is customary, not rational. The awakening
of  this  sense is  the awakening of  the modern spirit” (92).  The genius of Dewey’s critical
history of philosophy is his ability to defer the creation of an artificial end for this
practice, just as in his political philosophy he abjured predicting or prescribing final
ends because authentic politics requires inclusion of individuals. “Those who live with
a sense of [a] definitely achieved present exist in a state of hallucination,” he writes;
and this idea, no matter how unsettling, is genuine possibility (92).
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